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In ​Down’s Syndrome Screening and Reproductive Politics ​Gareth Thomas uses an 
ethnographic approach to explore how screening for Down’s syndrome has become a 
routine and normal part of prenatal care, focusing on the healthcare professionals involved in 
providing screening. This approach provides fertile ground for a number of unique 
observations that are rarely wrestled with in the literature surrounding prenatal screening 
and Down’s syndrome.  
 
Beginning with a short introduction, Thomas provides a coherent and insightful 
socio-historical narrative that sets the scene for the rest of the book. It describes some of the 
significant moments over the last 200 years that culminated with screening for Down’s 
syndrome becoming a routine feature of prenatal care. The term ‘mongolism’; first coined in 
1838 and described what we now know as Down’s syndrome. People with the condition 
were still being forcibly incarcerated and/or sterilised well into the 1970’s in some places. 
Screening for the condition began in the late 1980’s with the first routine screening 
programme beginning in Newport and Cardiff in 1990. This section provides an invaluable 
overview of the social, technological, political and cultural developments that led to 
screening for the condition becoming a routine aspect of prenatal care in the UK and around 
the world.  
 
Predominantly, research has explored how screening can affect pregnant women. Here, 
however, Thomas adds something both distinctive and challenging. He describes immersing 
himself in the culture of the two UK prenatal clinics where his ethnographic research took 
place. This enabled him to observe what he describes as the frontstage and backstage 
interactions that took place. By observing healthcare professionals in both their public 
(frontstage) and private (backstage) capacity Thomas is able to provide a broader and richer 
picture of their perceptions of prenatal screening and their role in its provision. This approach 
makes it possible to observe the private misgivings about screening for Down’s syndrome 
shared by some professionals.  
 
For instance, one female sonographer describes fearing that screening for Down’s syndrome 
is ‘eugenic’ because unlike many other syndromes, it is compatible with life. She then 
describes what she believes to be a ‘cultural shift towards perfection’ (p. 109), which 
combined with the routinisation of prenatal screening, establishes only the illusion of 
informed consent. Professionals were observed to rely upon assuming parents had given 
their informed consent​ ​to screening and by providing non-directive​ ​care shifted any 
responsibility for the procedure to the prospective parents-to-be. This seemed to function as 
a means for the midwives and sonographers to rationalise any backstage reservations they 
had about the moral ambiguity of Down’s syndrome screening.  
 
Thomas notes that in the clinic’s backstage, professionals frequently describe Down’s 
syndrome in positive terms. However, this positive framing was not observed in the 
‘frontstage’ screening consultation discourse - instead the condition was constructed (albeit 
unintentionally Thomas believes) as a negative pregnancy outcome. Thomas explains the 
inconsistency between what professionals ​say​ and what they ​do​ by appealing to the concept 
of motility. Motility refers ‘to how people or things are moved in different spaces of discourse’ 
(p. 9). It is this motility that allows professionals to switch between constructing the condition 
in positive or more negative ways depending on the context and space.  
 
Furthermore, a Down’s syndrome diagnosis itself was frequently described negatively within 
the context of the screening consultation. Professionals often utilised terms such as ‘risk’ 
and ‘problem’ which signify something negative to be avoided. This was further complicated 
by the discursive shift between a baby and a foetus following a diagnosis. Those shifts in 
language can both reinforce negative assumptions about disability and have a dehumanising 
effect on the foetus with Down’s syndrome. The absence of neutrality might be tied up with 
the negative cultural assumptions about disability and the expectation that pregnancy must 
end with the archetypal child. The availability of a termination following a diagnosis only 
seems to lend support to the cultural expectation for perfection, functioning as a means of 
quality control. Conceivably, the routinisation of prenatal screening has played a significant 
role in radically altering the foetal-maternal relationship into something increasingly tentative 
and conditional. This means that if the foetus no longer meets our culture's standards of 
normalcy her continued right to existence becomes questionable – a right that must be 
argued for, rather than merely presupposed.  
 
Some of the professionals Thomas observed during screening consultations demonstrated 
low levels of knowledge of Down’s syndrome, and did not always communicate the variability 
of the condition. Thomas notes 'This knowledge is not attributable to ineptitude but, rather, is 
a product of relegating (and subsequently downgrading) screening to professionals who may 
not always have a clear grasp of the condition.' (p. 127). Many of the professionals 
(midwives and sonographers) by their own admission described not possessing an extensive 
knowledge of the condition and feeling uncomfortable about being asked questions from 
parents-to-be. Should the absence of a more extensive knowledge of the condition be 
representative of a wider problem, then this research may encourage those providing 
screening to attain a more appropriate level of understanding about the condition. Thomas’ 
evidence of low levels of knowledge are all the more surprising, because many of the same 
professionals claimed that the public perception of Down’s syndrome was largely negative 
and poorly informed.  
 
Thomas argues that screening is downgraded and perceived by professionals as a mundane 
and trivial task. By downgraded Thomas describes ‘...practices which denigrate and 
minimise the importance, value, and reputation of someone or something.’ (p. 48). He 
subsequently refers to three interrelated observations that support this, these are: (1) the 
initial undertaking of screening is relegated from the domain of consultants to midwives and 
sonographers, until a Down's syndrome diagnosis is made and further diagnostic tests or a 
termination might be considered, (2) professionals describing screening as ​just a chat ​which 
reinforces the routinisation narrative, and (3) professionals considering screening to be a 
valueless task that is not worthy of their primary attention. 
 
A further problem Thomas highlights is that for prenatal screening to continue to be regarded 
as a routine component of prenatal care, Down’s syndrome ​must​ be considered abnormal, 
and therefore an inherently negative pregnancy outcome. Although he is very careful to 
qualify it, it is difficult to disagree with Thomas’ conclusion that ‘Down’s syndrome screening 
could be considered as a mode of contemporary eugenics, in that it effaces, devalues, and 
has the potential to prevent the births of people with the condition.’ (p. 182): something that 
must prompt us to consider the moral problems of new technology such as non-invasive 
prenatal testing (NIPT). How can the language of  ‘choice’ have any real meaning when 
screening for Down’s syndrome can be done earlier, more accurately and with little risk? If 
and perhaps when NIPT becomes more widely available it is not difficult to imagine what this 
‘choice’ will entail for the foetus with Down’s syndrome. Arguably Thomas’s ethnography 
demonstrates that the foetus with Down’s syndrome is ascribed very little moral value in the 
context of prenatal care. 
 In summary, Down’s Syndrome Screening and Reproductive Politics​ is a ​clear, thoughtful 
and measured presentation of Thomas’ arguments. He comes across as a measured 
researcher and is careful not to overstate his claims as he sets out to demonstrate that 
screening for Down’s syndrome has become a routinised part of pregnancy, is downgraded 
by professionals in their daily practices and discourse, and that the condition represents a 
negative pregnancy outcome. This is done succinctly and cogently and will be of interest to 
scholars and students interested in bioethics, medical sociology, genetics and the ongoing 
debates in reproductive ethics and politics. 
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